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The effect of pension obligations on share prices is of intrinsic interest to 
anyone concerned with the efficiency of capital markets and the nature of 
corporate financial decisions. More generally, however, the ability of 
share prices to reflect unfunded pension obligations is an important link 
in the effect of private pensions on national saving (Feldstein 1978~).  If 
unfunded obligations are not fully reflected in share prices, the equity 
owners will  be induced to increase their consumption incorrectly  and 
national saving will be lower than it would be with correct perceptions. 
In this chapter we use a new body of  data on corporate pensions to 
evaluate how unfunded pension liabilities influence the value of corpo- 
rate equities and to begin  an empirical  examination of  the corporate 
decision not to fund pension obligations fully. The important and novel 
feature of  the new data is information on the interest rate assumed by 
each firm in  evaluating the present  value  of  its pension obligations.' 
Before such interest rate information became available, it was difficult to 
interpret and compare differences among firms in the extent of unfunded 
pension obligations. In a previous study, Feldstein and Seligman (1981) 
warned that the heterogeneity of  interest rate assumptions was the source 
of  a potentially serious problem in measuring the key variable in their 
study of the effect of  unfunded pension liabilities on share prices.* The 
new data make it possible to assess the importance of this source of  bias 
and to examine whether the market takes the differences in interest rate 
assumptions into account in evaluating pension liabilities. 
Martin Feldstein is professor of  economics, Harvard University, and past president of 
the National  Bureau of  Economic Research. Randall  Morck is affiliated with  Harvard 
University and the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
We are grateful to members of  the NBER study of  public and private pensions for 
comments  and discussion,  especially  to Jeremy  Bulow,  Stewart Myers,  and Lawrence 
Summers. 
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To understand the link  between  national  saving  and  the effect  of 
pension obligations on share prices, it is useful to consider the effect of a 
firm that obtains lower present wages in exchange for a promise of future 
pension  benefits  with  the same present  value  but  does not  fund the 
resulting pension obligation. As a result, the firm reports higher earnings 
and adds the earnings to its capital stock. Over time, the firm’s capital 
stock is increased by an amount equal to its unfunded pension obligation. 
If  shareholders correctly perceive  the unfunded  obligation, they  will 
recognize that the change in the form of employee compensation has not 
made the shareholders  any wealthier, and their consumption will remain 
unchanged. The net effect of the pension on national saving will therefore 
be the difference between the firm’s additional retained earnings and the 
reduction in the employee’s direct personal saving that is induced by the 
promise of retirement benefits.’ If, however, the share price understates 
the unfunded pension obligation, shareholders will regard themselves as 
wealthier,  increase their consumption, and thus reduce national saving by 
a corresponding amount.4 
The effect of unfunded pension obligations has attracted attention not 
only because a significant fraction of  the pension obligations of  some 
firms is now unfunded but also because alternative legal funding require- 
ments could increase the extent to which pension  obligations  are not 
explicitly funded. Current Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
and tax rules require companies to fund their pension obligations over a 
period  of  years and permit  a deduction in  the calculation  of  taxable 
income only for the amount contributed to a fund. An alternative rule 
would be a “book reserving” system in which a firm would not be obliged 
to fund its pension  obligation but  could deduct  for tax purposes  the 
present value of a pension obligation that it assumes even if it does not 
fund that obligation as long as it reports the obligation on its “books” 
(i.e., balance sheet) and finds an appropriate organization like an insur- 
ance company  or bank  to “guarantee” that pension  obligation.  The 
national savings impact of  unfunded pensions of this type would depend 
on the ability of  share prices to reflect  the accumulating liability  and 
therefore to prevent shareholders from increasing their consumption in 
response to the apparent but artificial increase in the net assets of  the 
firm. 
In considering a firm’s pension obligations, it is important to distin- 
guish vested benefits from other types of  expected pension payments. 
The  vested benefits are those that will be paid to existing retirees and that 
would have to be paid to current employees even if  they left the firm 
immediately. In addition to these vested benefits, there are also two other 
types of  benefits that a firm or its shareholders might take into account. 
First, “unvested  accrued pension  benefits”  refer  to the benefits that 
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but which have not yet become vested. Second, firms also look ahead 
and, on the basis of expected employee turnover and projected wages, 
estimate the pension benefits that current employees are likely to receive 
when they retire. Firms may use this very broad concept of  benefits based 
on past  and future employment  for  the purpose  of  determining  the 
tax-deductible contributions that they can make to their pension fund. 
Pension assets can therefore exceed both vested pension liabilities and 
total past service liabilities. 
Focusing on the vested pension benefits is important for two reasons. 
First, vested benefits are the only legal obligation of  the firm and have 
been the principal  concern of  financial  analysts who  discuss  pension 
obligations. Moreover, as Bulow (1979, 1982) has explained, the cost to 
the firm of any nonvested pension benefits can in principle be offset by 
corresponding  reductions in  wage payments as those benefits become 
vested. However, as Feldstein and Seligman (1981) note, it is not clear to 
what extent such wage adjustments  are actually made in practice or taken 
into account by financial analysts. It is noteworthy, though, that while 
firms are required to report values for vested  benefit  obligations and 
sometimes report values for other past  service liabilities, the broader 
measure of total expected liabilities is not reported. 
Most of the estimates presented in this chapter refer to the difference 
between vested  pension liabilities and pension assets. The “unfunded 
vested pension liability” (UVPL) reported by the firms in our sample is in 
fact negative for more than two-thirds of the firms in our basic sample (92 
of  132 firms reported negative UVPL), implying that their pension fund 
assets exceed their vested liabilities. Moreover, the aggregate value of 
pension assets of  the firm in our sample exceed the aggregate value of 
vested pension liabilities. Some analyses using the broader measure of 
total unfunded accrued pension liabilities (UAPL) will also be reported. 
For this variable, 62% of  the firms in our basic sample reported a negative 
value  .5 
Those firms with negative unfunded liabilities have accumulated more 
in pension assets than the present value of the pension benefits they have 
promised to  their employees. If these benefit promises establish an upper 
limit on the extent to which the pensions depress private saving,‘ the 
“superfunded” pensions are  potential net contributors to national saving. 
The extent to which superfunded pensions do increase national saving 
depends on the response of shareholders. To the extent that share prices 
ignore the value of  these excess reserves, the extra corporate pension 
fund accumulations will not be offset by reduced shareholder  saving. Our 
analysis will generally treat underfunded and superfunded  pension liabili- 
ties symmetrically by using a single variable to represent the net liability 
of firms. In section 7.4, however, we will examine this symmetry assump- 
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The first section of the chapter discusses the data that we use and the 
basic specification of the corporate  valuation equations  that are estimated 
in this chapter. In section 7.2 we present the basic estimates of the effect 
on firms’ market values of  the net unfunded pension liabilities that the 
firms report. The third section discusses the importance of the alternative 
interest rate assumptions used in calculating the present value of liabili- 
ties and presents alternative estimates based on the use of  a common 
interest rate for all firms. 
The analysis in sections 7.2 and 7.3 estimates linear relations between 
the market value of  the firm and the net unfunded pension  liabilities. 
Section 7.4 considers two generalizations of this basic specification: sepa- 
rate effects of  pension assets and of  liabilities, and different effects of 
positive and negative unfunded liabilities. The fifth section provides some 
evidence on why  firms choose different interest  rate assumptions for 
valuing pension liabilities and, more generally, why firms have different 
unfunded pension  liabilities.  There is  a brief  concluding section that 
summarizes the fundings,  comments  on  the implication  for  national 
saving, and indicates some possible directions for future research. 
7.1  The Specification and Data 
The framework for our analysis is a valuation model that relates the 
market value of the firm per dollar of its physical capital to several basic 
determinants of  market value  including  the  firm’s unfunded  pension 
liability. The basic specification is thus the same as that used in Feldstein 
and Seligman (1981) and therefore builds on earlier studies of  market 
valuation  by  Modigliani  and Miller  (1958), Gordon (1962),  Oldfield 
(1977), Tobin and Brainard (1977), and others. 
Under certain strict conditions, the market value (V)  of a firm’s equity 
and debt will be equal to  the replacement value of its underlying physical 
assets (A).  More generally, however, the marginal and average values of 
physical assets will not be the same,’ and even the marginal value of an 
additional amount of  physical capital will differ from one if  there are 
distortionary taxes’ or if  the firm’s capital stock is not in  equilibrium. 
Differences among firms in the observed valuation ratio, q = VIA  will 
reflect  perceived  differences in  the firms’ abilities to provide  above- 
average earnings and in the riskiness of their earnings and asset value. 
The  potential earning ability of a firm depends on such things as market 
position, patents, know-how, etc. The specification used in the present 
study represents future earnings by three variables: (1) the current ratio 
of earnings to physical assets, EIA, where E includes interest payments as 
well as equity profits;’ (2) the growth of earnings over the past decade, 
GROW;’”  and (3) expenditure on research and development as a fraction 
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The capital asset pricing model implies that the risk of investment in a 
firm’s equity should be measured by the beta coefficient measure of the 
sensitivity of  the firm’s share price  to the value of  the total  market 
portfolio. The beta value for a firm depends on how broadly the “total 
market portfolio” is defined (equities only; all financial assets; all invest- 
ment  assets including  land, gold, etc.)  and on the frequency  of  the 
observations used for calculating the beta coefficient  (daily, monthly, 
annual, etc.).  The  present study employs the widely available beta values 
based  on monthly observations and an equity market portfolio that is 
calculated by Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith. 
A second measure of risk included in the current study is the ratio of 
the net debt to total capital, DEBTIA.” A higher debt ratio increases the 
risk of  bankruptcy and limits the firm’s ability to undertake potentially 
profitable investment activities.  l2 
Because unfunded vested pension liabilities are a form of corporate 
debt,  l3 they should in principle be included with other debts in measuring 
the market value  of  the  firm  (V)  and  in  calculating  the net DEBT 
variable. If the pension liability of the firm were accurately measured,l4 
the unfunded vested liability could be added directly to  the market value 
of  conventional debt or, equivalently, could be included on the right- 
hand side of the equation (divided by the replacement value of physical 
assets) where the expected value of  its coefficient would be minus one. 
More generally,  however,  the  coefficient  of  the  observed  unfunded 
vested  pension  liability variable,  UVPLIA, reflects  the errors in  the 
measurement of  unfunded  pension  liabilities  and  the stock market’s 
ability to perceive and reflect the existing liabilities. 
The specification of  the market valuation equation is thus 
E  RD 
= a” + a1 -  + a2 GROW + a3- 
A  A  A 
DEBT  UVPL 
A  A  + a4BETA + (~5-  + ag-  + E, 
where  E  represents a random error. The values of al,  a2,  and a3 are 
expected to be positive, and the values of a4  and (Yg are expected to be 
negative. The sign of a5  (the coefficient of the debt variable) is uncertain. 
In a strict Modigliani-Miller world, a5  would be zero. More generally, the 
increased risks of  bankruptcy and the adverse effect of  debt on invest- 
ment opportunities would imply that a5  is negative. However, if the tax 
factors discussed by Auerbach (1979) and King (1977) make the value of 
VIA less than one for equity while the value of  VIA for debt is equal to 
one, firms with higher ratios of debt to physical assets will have higher 
values of VIA and a5 may be positive. 
As we noted in our introduction, our analysis will examine both the 182  Martin FeldsteidRandall  M~rck 
unfunded  vested pension obligations and the broader measure of the total 
unfunded accrued liabilities (UAPL/A). 
The specification of equation (1) assumes that the valuation ratio (4)  is 
the same for debt and for equity. If, because of tax or risk factors, a dollar 
of  retained earnings is not worth the same amount as a dollar of  capital 
financed by debt, it would be more appropriate to analyze the effect of 
pension liabilities on the equity value of  the firm (VE).  This alternative 
equity value equation may be written 
EE  RD 
AE  AE  AE 
-_  vE  -  po + pl-  + p2 GROWE + p3- 
uvpL  + E,  DEBT  + p4 BETA +  ps-  + p6-  AE  AE 
where AE  is the “equity value” of the physical assets (i.e., the replace- 
ment value of  the physical assets minus the value of  the net debt and of 
the preferred shares), EE  is the equity earnings of the firm, and GROWE 
is the 10-year growth of  equity earnings. For this purpose, EE is defined 
as profits after tax plus the equity owners’ real gain or loss on net financial 
assets (i.e., the product of  the inflation rate and the firm’s net financial 
debt). 
Our analysis is based on data for a sample of large manufacturing firms 
for 1979. The construction of most of  the variables uses the data in the 
Standard and Poor’s Compustat file. Three factors limit the size of  the 
available sample. First, since comparable information on earnings for the 
decade from 1970 through 1979 must be available, firms that were en- 
gaged in significant merger activity had to be eliminated. Second, the 
interest rate assumed in the pension liability calculation was only avail- 
able for 1979  for some firms. Third, the information required for inflation 
adjustment (described below) was not available for all firms. These data 
requirements and the elimination of  a few statistical outliers reduced the 
sample to 132 firms. 
Economists have long recognized that accounting data for assets and 
earnings can be very misleading in a period of  inflation like the 1970s. 
Beginning with 1976, firms were required to provided information on the 
replacement value of the firm’s capital stock and on the effect of inflation 
on the value of  accounting depreciation and inventory costs. With this 
information and an estimate of the inflation gain on net financial liabili- 
ties, it is possible to estimate an inflation-adjusted measure of accounting 
profits. This was the procedure found in the earlier Feldstein-Seligman 
analysis for 1976 and 1977. 
Despite the accounting requirement  to provide inflation-adjusted in- 
formation and the widespread recognition of  the distortions created by 
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the traditional accounting measures  of assets and income. One important 
indication of this tendency to disregard the inflation-adjusted data is that 
by  1979 Standard and Poor’s no longer included the inflation-adjusted 
accounts in its Compustat file. 
Because we are concerned with market valuation and the perception of 
the financial community, we have done our analysis with the conventional 
accounting data as well as with data adjusted for inflation. Because the 
inflation-adjusted data are not available in the Compustat file, we have 
approximated the inflation correction for 1979 by using data for  1980 
collected from individual annual reports by Daniel Smith and Lawrence 
Summers and then  deflated  to the  1979 level.  One of  the  principal 
accounting distortions caused by inflation is the misstatement of inven- 
tory costs for firms that use first-in-first-out (FIFO) inventory accounting. 
As a further check on our results, we also present estimates only for those 
firms that used last-in-first-out (LIFO) as the primary method of  inven- 
tory evaluation. 
We are aware of  the difficulty of  making valid inferences about the 
effect of  unfunded pension liabilities on the basis of  equations like (1) and 
(2). Any omitted variables will  bias the estimated coefficient. If, for 
example, large unfunded vested liabilities are characteristic of financially 
weak companies, the estimates of  Pb and (Yb would reflect this weakness 
and be biased  away  from  -1.  Moreover, firms  can  to some extent 
influence the size of their reported liabilities by the interest rate assump- 
tion that they choose. 
A finding  that the coefficient of the pension liability variable is substan- 
tially different from -1  must be treated with substantial caution since the 
difference  may reflect statistical bias rather than a failure of the financial 
market to appraise the extent of a firm’s pension obligations. In contrast, 
a finding that the pension liability variable has a coefficient of approx- 
imately -1  would be reassuring support for the view that the financial 
market correctly assesses pension liabilities since finding the appropriate 
answer by chance alone, although possible, would be very unlikely. 
7.2  Effects of Unfunded Pension Liabilities 
In this section we present the basic estimates of the effects on the value 
of  the firm of the net pension liabilities as reported by the firms. The next 
section discusses the importance of the interest rate assumption used in 
valuing pension liabilities and their present parameter estimates based on 
alternative  revaluated pension liabilities. The estimates in Section 7.4 
examine several general specifications of  the relation between pension 
liabilities and the firm’s market value. 
Equation (1.1) of  table 7.1 reports the estimated coefficients corre- 
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Table 7.1  Reported Pension Liabilities and the Market Value of the Firm 
~  -~ 
Total Market Value of  Debt and Equity 
Eq.  EY  EY  EY  EY  EY 


















UVPLIA  -  1.43 
(0.82) 
UAPLIA  - 
EIA  2.06 
(0.38) 
GROW  0.15 
(0.22) 
(1.02) 
RDIA  8.13 
BETA  -0.17 
(0.08) 
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(0.83) 
-  1.43  - 
(0.65) 
1.30  1.31 
(0.34)  (0.34) 
0.28  0.28 
(0.22)  (0.22) 
4.31  4.66 
(1.36)  (1.35) 
0.05  0.05 
(0.09)  (0.09) 
0.26  0.25 
(0.19)  (0.18) 
0.46  0.47 
(0.11)  (0.11) 
85  85 
0.28  0.28 
5.34  5.30 




































Nofe: See text for definitions. Standard errors are  shown in parentheses. Pension liabilities 
are reported amounts. 
'Inflation  adjusted. 
paper. The sample contains  all  132 firms and uses inflation-adjusted 
accounting measures of income and assets. The mean of  the dependent 
variable, the ratio of  the firm's market value to the current value of its 
physical assets, is 0.87. 
Before discussing the coefficient of  the pension variable, it is useful to 
comment on the coefficients of the other variables. An increase in the 
firm's capital income (i.e., the debt and equity earnings, E)  per dollar of 
physical assets increases the market value of those assets. An extra dollar 
of current earnings adds approximately two dollars to the market value of 
the firm. The coefficient of  GROW suggests that a higher rate of  past 
increase of earnings may lead to a higher market value but the coefficient 185  Pension Funding Interest Rate Assumptions, and Share Prices 
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hNot inflation adjusted. 
‘Inventory method  = all. 
“Inventory method = last in first out. 
is  smaller  than  its  standard error.” Companies  that spend  more on 
research  and development  have  significantly greater market value,  a 
relationship  that should be interpreted with care since it presumably 
reflects the market’s valuation of the general character of companies that 
spend more on research rather than a direct effect of  research spending 
on the firm’s market value. All three of  these effects are similar to the 
estimates for 1976 and 1977 reported in Feldstein and Seligman (1981). 
A greater riskiness of  the firm, as measured by its beta coefficient, 
depresses the firm. This is consistent with the theoretical implications of 
the capital asset pricing model, although contrary to the insignificant 
effect found for 1976 and 1977. The weak positive effect of leverage on 186  Martin FeldsteidRandall M~rck 
the firm’s total value is also contrary to the earlier Feldstein-Seligman 
finding.  One possible  explanation  of  this difference  is  that the sharp 
increase in inflation (the consumer price index rose 4.8% and 6.8% in 
1976 and 1977, but 13.3% in 1979) might have raised the equity value of 
the firms with greater net debt (Summers 1982). 
The coefficient of the unfunded vested liability variable (UVPL/A)  is 
-1.43 with a standard error of 0.82. The effect is thus clearly significantly 
negative and not significantly different from minus one. By coincidence, 
this coefficient is almost identical to the 1977 value of  -1.44  (standard 
error 0.47) reported by Feldstein and Seligman (1981). The estimate is 
consistent with the view that the financial market accepts the conven- 
tional measure of  the net unfunded vested pension liability and reduces 
the market value of  the firm by an equal amount.lh 
Broadening the definition of unfunded liabilities from vested liabilities 
to accrued liabilities (eq. [1.2]) leaves all of  the parameter estimates 
essentially  unchanged.  The coefficient  of  UAPLIA, is  -1.42  with  a 
standard error of  0.65. The sum of squared residuals (SSR = 13.18) is 
slightly smaller than the corresponding SSR for the vested pension liabil- 
ity, suggesting that the financial market may give more weight to the 
broader means of pension liabilities. 
One purpose of the inflation adjustment is to correct the understate- 
ment of production costs for firms that do not use the LIFO method of 
inventory accounting.  By  1979, the inflation adjustment had  become 
extremely important; for all nonfinancial corporations as a whole, the 
inflation adjustment was more than 60% of  real after-tax profits. As a 
further check, we therefore estimated the basic equation for the subset of 
85 firms that used LIFO as the primary method of  inventory accounting. 
The results, presented in equations (1.3) and (1.4), are essentially the 
same as for the entire sample. 
Although our emphasis is on the estimates using inflation-adjusted 
data for earnings and assets, we recognize that the financial community 
continues to rely primarily on conventional accounting data. We have 
therefore  reestimated  the  basic  equations  using  the  conventional 
accounting figures; the results are shown in equations (1.5) and (1.6).” 
The estimates of the unfunded pension liability variables are essentially 
unchanged; they are slightly larger than with the inflation-adjusted data, 
but the difference is less than one standard error. Earnings, earnings 
growth,  and debt appear to have  a larger effect on the value  of  the 
corporation, and the level of research and development spending has a 
smaller effect. The unfunded accrued liabilities continue to have slightly 
greater explanatory power than the unfunded vested liabilities. 
The second set of  six equations in table 7.1 are based on the equity 
value of the firm and used the specification of  equation (2) in section 7.1 .’* 187  Pension Funding Interest Rate Assumptions, and Share Prices 
The coefficients of  the four equations estimated with inflation-adjusted 
data (eq. [1.7]-[1.10])  are essentially  identical  to the corresponding 
coefficients based on the market value of  debt and equity (eq. [1.1]- 
[1.4]). This similarity of results with the two specifications was also found 
for 1976 and 1977 by Feldstein and Seligman (1981). When the conven- 
tional accounting data are used without  adjustment for inflation  (eq. 
[  1.111, [  1.12]), the coefficients of the unfunded pension liability variables 
are reduced substantially to approximately -  0.7 and are about equal in 
size to their standard errors. On the basis of these two coefficients alone, 
one could not reject the hypothesis that the true parameter is either zero 
or minus one. Although we  regard  the instability  of  the coefficients 
estimated with conventional accounting data as evidence against relying 
on such data without inflation adjustment, we recognize that these esti- 
mates can also be interpreted as raising some doubt about the conclusion 
that the coefficient of the pension variable is significantly negative. We 
shall therefore continue to present estimates in the later sections of  the 
chapter based on the conventional accounting data as well as on the 
inflation-adjusted data. 
7.3  Alternative Interest Rate Assumptions 
It has been customary for pension actuaries to assume a low rate of 
interest in calculating the present value of  pension liabilities. Thus the 
average interest rate assumed by the 132 firms in our sample was only 
7.3%, far less than the 12.1%  rate on Baa bonds that prevailed at the end 
of  1979 or the 10.7% average Baa rate for the year 1979 as a wh01e.I~ 
Using a low discount rate increases the present value of vested pension 
benefits and therefore of the unfunded pension liability. 
In considering the effect of the interest rate assumption, it is important 
to distinguish  between  vested  pension  liabilities and  the total  future 
pension benefits that a firm expects to pay to its current employees and on 
the basis of which it may legally determine its funding contributions. In 
estimating the total future pension benefits, the firm must project the 
employees’ future wage growth (as well as the probabilities of death and 
of  employment separation). The typical pension benefit formula relates 
an individual’s retirement benefits to his wage during a year or a few years 
immediately  before  retirement. The present  value  at any time  in  an 
employee’s career of the benefits that he will be paid during his first year 
of retirement depends on the difference between the discount rate and 
the projected rate of  growth of  wages.  Since pension  actuaries have 
generally assumed a low rate of wage growth, the use of  a low discount 
rate may not produce as substantial a bias in their estimates of total future 
pension liabilities as it might at first appear. The value of  benefits to be 188  Martin Feldstein/Randall Morck 
paid  after  retirement,  however,  depends only  on the discount  rate, 
implying that the present value of total future pension benefits is typically 
overstated. 
Vested pension benefits depend only on an employee’s previous ex- 
perience with  the firm. Although  that experience will  entitle the em- 
ployee to greater future benefits if he stays with the firm,’” the future 
annual value of his benefit is fixed if he leaves the firm immediately. Thus, 
in  calculating  the present  value  of  vested  benefits,  the likely  future 
growth of  wages  is  irrelevant. The assumptions of  an  artificially  low 
interest rate unambiguously raises the value of vested pension liabilities.” 
Thc same upward bias occurs in the calculations of the present value of 
unvested benefits based on past service and therefore on the total accrued 
pension liability. 
The 132 companies in our sample assumed interest rates that ranged 
from 5% to 10.5%. For all but 13 companies, the rate was between 6% 
and 9%. The assumed interest rates thus differ significantly from each 
other and from the actual rate of return available on pension fund assets. 
Since the firms reported pension  assets and vested  liabilities that are 
approximately equal in value,22  a change in the interest rate could have a 
significant effect on the estimate of  unfunded liabilities and therefore 
potentially on the estimated regression coefficient of  this variable in the 
market value equation. 
The effect that changes in the interest rate assumption can have on the 
present value of vested pension benefits depends on the current distribu- 
tion of vested benefits among employees and retirees of different ages. 
Table 7.2 shows the actuarial present value of a dollar a year from age 65 
until  death evaluated  at ages  between  45  and  70 for three different 
interest rates.”  The closer an employee is to retirement, the nearer in 
time are his benefits and the less sensitive is their present value to the 
interest rate assumption. For example, increasing the discount rate from 
6% to 8% reduces the value of the pension benefit by 14% at age 65 but 
21% at age 60. 
Unfortunately, data are not available for each firm on the distribution 
of vested pension benefits by employee and retiree age. Although the 
actual distribution will  differ among firms, it is  clear that most of  the 
“weight” of the typical vested pension distribution is among retirees and 
older employees in the years just before retirement. This concentration 
reflects three things. First and most important, the benefits of retirees  and 
older workers are closer in time and therefore subject to less mortality 
risk and less interest rate discounting. Table 7.2 shows that the present 
actuarial value of a given benefit is reduced to half or less between the 
ages of 65 and 55. Moreover, the actuarial present value of  a one-dollar 
annual benefit at age 70 is worth more than the prospect at age 60 of a one 
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Table 7.2  Actuarial Present Value of One Dollar 
Annual Pension from Age 65 
Interest Rate 
Age  .06  .08  0.10 
70  6.5  5.9  4.3 
65  9.0  7.9  6.5 
60  6.0  4.9  3.6 
55  4.3  3.2  2.2 
45  2.2  1.3  0.8 
generally  accumulated  more years  of  service with  a firm  and vested 
benefits are generally proportional to the number and years of service 
after an initial period. Finally older workers generally have higher earn- 
ings and vested benefits are also proportional to 
Bulow (1979) reports that professional actuaries often assume as a rule 
of  thumb that the age distribution of  vested benefits is such that the 
overall present value of vested benefits is inversely proportional to the 
rate of interest. It is clear from table 7.2  that the actual relation differs by 
age and that the inverse proportionality rule holds at about age 55 for a 
comparison of 6 and 8 percent interest rates and at about age 65 for a 
comparison of 8% and 10% interest rates. Our analysis in this paper uses 
the inverse proportionality  assumption because data for developing  a 
better weighting are not available. While we believe that the resulting 
estimates of vested pension liabilities are an improvement over using the 
reported values with varying interest rate assumptions, we caution that 
the adjustment procedure is only an approximation. It would clearly be 
desirable to obtain information on the age distribution of vested benefits 
for all companies in the sample or even for a smaller sample of companies 
that might be used to develop weights to apply to figures like those of 
table 7.2. 
We have  made two different  types  of  interest  rate adjustments in 
recalculating pension benefits. First, we standardized all pension liabili- 
ties to the Baa bond rate of 12.1% prevailing at the end of 1979. Since no 
firm used an interest rate even remotely as high as this, it seems unlikely 
that the financial market implicitly used such a high rate in evaluating the 
unfunded pension liabilities. This is confirmed by the estimates presented 
below that show using such a high discount rate reduces the explanatory 
power of  the market valuation equation and causes the coefficient of  the 
pension liability variables to be small and insignificant. 
The second adjustment standardizes all pension liabilities to a discount 
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has the effect of  eliminating the relative overstatements and understate- 
ments of pension liabilities that result from the variety of  interest rate 
assumptions while changing very little the estimated liability for firms that 
use a rate close to  the average for the group. It is equivalent to assuming 
that financial markets adjust the stated pension liabilities for deviations 
from common practice rather than for deviations from a Baa rate. 
Table 7.3 summarizes the effect of different interest rate assumptions 
on the estimated impact of pension liabilities on the market value of  the 
firm. The estimates are based on the specifications presented in table 7.1 
and therefore in equations (1) and (2) of section 7.1. For each equation, 
table 7.3 presents only the estimated pension liability coefficient and the 
sum of  squared residuals for the corresponding equation. 
Consider first the effect of the unfunded vested liability on the total 
market value of  the firm. Using inflation-adjusted data and the reported 
value of the unfunded vested liability implies a regression coefficient of 
-1.43  with a standard error of 0.82. This figure was presented in equation 
(1.1)  of table 7.1  and is repeated in the first row of  table 7.3  corresponding 
to the “actual” interest rate. 
The present  value  of  vested  benefits discounted at the Baa rate is 
approximated by multiplying each firm’s reported liability by the ratio of 
its actual interest rate to the 1979 year-end Baa rate of 12.1  %. With this 
adjustment, almost all firms had negative  unfunded  vested  liabilities. 
Pension assets exceed the recalculated vested liabilities by amounts that 
averaged 8.7% of  the replacement value of  the firm’s physical assets. 
With these adjusted unfunded vested liabilities, the estimated regression 
coefficient is only -0.31  with a standard deviation of 0.43. The corre- 
sponding sum of  squared residuals  (13.65) is  greater than the sum of 
squared residuals with the actual interest rate (13.35), however, implying 
that the Baa rate is a less likely specification of  the market-valuations 
model. 
By contrast, adjusting the vested  pension  liabilities to the common 
average interest rate of 7.2% provides a substantially better explanation 
of  the data (the sum of  squared residuals is only 12.89) and implies a 
regression coefficient of -  0.90 with a standard error of 0.33. This evi- 
dence is consistent with the view that the financial markets disregard the 
differences caused by interest assumptions and evaluate pension liabili- 
ties in terms of a common average discount rate. Although we have not 
done a search over different possible interest rates to find a maximum 
likelihood estimate of this parameter, it is clear that the assumed average 
rate of 7.2 is substantially more likely than either the Baa rate or the 
variety of rates actually used by the individual companies. The regression 
coefficient of  -0.90  with a standard error of  0.33 strongly supports the 
view that unfunded vested pension obligations, when correctly valued, 
depress the value of the firm by approximately one dollar for every dollar Table 7.3  Estimated Effect of Liabilities with Alternative Interest Assumptions 
Total Market Value 
of  Debt and Equity  Market Value of  Equity 
Vested Liability  Accrued Liability  Vested Liability  Accrued Liability 
Interest 
Rate  Coefficient  SSR  Coefficient  SSR  Coefficient  SSR  Coefficient  SSR 
Inflation Adjusted 
Actual  -  1.43  15.35  -1.42  13.18  -  1.48  23.43  -  1.45  23.12 
(0.82)  (0.65)  (0.84)  (0.66) 
Baa  -0.31  13.62  -0.48  13.53  -0.39  23.81  -  0.56  23.60 
(0.43)  (0.43)  (0.37)  (0.37) 
(0.33)  (0.29)  (0.29)  (0.26) 
Average  -0.90  12.89  -  0.89  12.73  -  0.92  22.27  -  0.88  22.02 
Not Inflation Adjusted 
Actual  -  1.70  16.0.5  -  1.59  1.5.72  -0.67  54.61  -0.76  54.07 
(0.60)  (0.48)  (0.69)  (0.51) 
Baa  0.04  17.09  -0.14  17.07  -  0.65  52.87  -  0.79  51.81 
(0.35)  (0.34)  (0.29)  (0.28) 
Average  -0.64  16.26  -  0.65  16.04  -  0.85  47.88  -0.73  47.99 
(0.25)  (0.23)  (0.20)  (0.17) 
Note: The coefficient values are the estimated coefficients of  the pension liability variable in the specification of  equation (1) or (2). Standard errors are 
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of unfunded  obligation or, equivalently, raise the market value of  the 
firm by one dollar for every dollar of pension assets in excess of the vested 
pension liability. 
The results for the total accrued liabilities are very similar. The con- 
stant average interest rate has the best explanatory power (with a sum of 
squared residuals of  12.73) and a coefficient of  -0.89.  Comparing the 
sums of  squared residuals for total accrued liabilities and vested liabilities 
suggests that the accrued liability provides a slightly better explanation of 
the market value of  the firm. But the choice between vested and accrued 
liabilities does not influence the conclusion that the common average 
interest rate is best and that the effect of  net pension liabilities on the 
market value of  the firm is approximately dollar for dollar. 
Changing the specification from the total market value of  the firm to 
the market value of equity also has virtually no effect on the estimated 
coefficients of the unfunded pension liability variables. The specification 
with the lowest sum of squared residuals again corresponds to the un- 
funded  accrued  liability  evaluated  with  the common  average rate of 
return. 
When the conventional  accounting  data are used  without  inflation 
adjustment, the estimated coefficients are less stable. For the total mar- 
ket value of  the firm, the evidence indicates that the best specification 
uses the actual interest rate and unfunded accrued liabilities. The coef- 
ficient of the pension liability variable is  -1.59  with a standard error of 
0.48. The Baa rate has a substantially higher residual sum of  squares. 
With the common average interest rate, the coefficient is  -0.05  with a 
standard error of  0.23. 
Finally, for the market value of the corporate cquity, the best specifica- 
tion corresponds to the common average interest rate. The coefficient of 
the unfunded vested pension liability is -  0.85 with a standard error of 
0.20  and  therefore quite similar  to  the estimate  with  the  inflation- 
adjusted variables. Because the unfunded pension liabilities evaluated at 
a common  average  interest  rate generally  have  a better explanatory 
power  than  the  corresponding  reported pension  liabilities,  we  have 
reestimated the specifications of table 7.1 with these more appropriately 
measured pension variables. The results are presented in table 7.4. The 
coefficients of the pension variables estimated for our entire sample of 
firms have already been discussed in conjunction with table 7.3. For the 
sample of firms that use LIFO inventory accounting, the unfunded pen- 
sion liabilities are between  -1.54  and  -2.03.  The coefficients of  the 
other variables are quite similar to their values in table 7.1. 
Although we have included five variables that can influence the market 
value of the firm, it is of course still possible that the unfunded pension 
liability  is correlated with  some other omitted variable  and  that the 
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of this omitted variable. In particular, it might be argued that “strong” 
companies fully  fund  or overfund  their accumulated  liabilities while 
“weaker” companies have large unfunded liabilities. To the extent that 
this is true and that corporate strength and weakness are not reflected in 
the other variables, the negative coefficient of the unfunded liability will 
reflect the corporation’s generally weak financial position. Although it is 
clearly impossible to  rule out completely such an “omitted variable” 
argument, we have tried to test for the importance of  such an effect by 
reestimating the inflation-adjusted equations of  table 7.4 with the com- 
pany’s bond rating as an additional variable. The bond rating represents 
an expert judgment about the long-term financial strength of the com- 
pany. To incorporate this variable, we use the Moody’s bond rating for 
the longest maturity bond issued in 1979 and scale this rating from a 9 for 
an Aaa rated bond to 4 for a B rated bond. 
For  the equations determining  the total  market value  of  debt and 
equity, the coefficient of this variable was small (0.04) and barely larger 
than its standard error. Including it in the equation actually raised the 
absolute value of  the coefficient of  the pension liability variable. For the 
equation determining  the market value of  corporate equity, the coef- 
ficient of the bond rating variable is slightly larger (about 0.09) and about 
twice its standard error. Including this variable reduces the coefficient of 
the unfunded  pension  liability  variable by  approximately 0.05. Thus 
including a general measure of  the financial strength of the company does 
not alter the estimated effect of  unfunded 
7.4  Additional Specification 
The estimates  presented in the previous sections assume that there is a 
linear relation between the market value of the firm and its unfunded 
vested  pension  liabilities.  This specification implies that a one-dollar 
increase in the firm’s pension liability has the same effect on the firm’s 
value as a one-dollar decrease in the value of the firm’s pension assets. 
The linear specification also implies that the market responds in the same 
way  to unfunded  liabilities that  are positive  as it  does to unfunded 
liabilities that are negative. The present section presents estimates that 
relax these constraints. 
7.4.1  Separating Assets and Liabilities 
The equations in table 7.5 include the value of pension assets per dollar 
of  the firms’ physical assets (PAIA or PAIAE) as well as the unfunded 
pension liability variables. All of  the equations are based on inflation- 
adjusted data and separate estimates are presented using the reported 
pension liabilities and liabilities adjusted to a common average discount 
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Table 7.4  Adjusted Pension Liabilities and the Market Value of the Firm 
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-  -  0.64 
(0.25) 
-1.54  - 
(0.50) 
1.28  4.88 
(0.33)  (0.41) 
0.33  0.24 
(0.21)  (0.16) 
4.36  5.35 
(1.31)  (0.89) 
0.07  -0.23 
(0.09)  (0.08) 
0.29  0.37 
(0.18)  (0.15) 
0.46  0.42 
(0.10)  (0.13) 
85  132 
0.32  0.67 
5.03  16.26 
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Note: See text for definitions. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Pension liabilities 
adjusted to a common average interest. 
"Inflation adjusted. 
The coefficients in  equation (5.1) are representative  of  all  of  the 
equations for total market value of  debt and equity in this table. The 
estimated parameter values for the nonpension variables are very similar 
to the corresponding figures in equation (1.1) of  table 7.1,  which had the 
same specification without  the separate pension  assets variable.  The 
coefficient of  unfunded vested pension liabilities is  now slightly lower 
( -1.14 with a standard error of 0.82), while the coefficient of the pension 
assets variable is  -0.55  with a standard error of 0.28. 
Including the pension asset variable is equivalent to estimating sepa- 
rate coefficients for vested pension liabilities and pension  assets. The 
coefficient of UVPLIA measures the effect of increases in vested pension 
liabilities ( -  $1.14  of market value per dollar of vested pension liability), 195  Pension Funding Interest Rate Assumptions, and Share Prices 
Market Value of  Corporate Equity 
Eq. 
(4.7)"' 
Eq.  Eq.  Eq.  Eq.  Eq. 
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hNot inflation adjusted. 
'Inventory  method = all. 
%ventory  method = last in first out 
while the difference between the coefficients of  PAIA and of  UVPLIA 
measures  the  effect  of  increases  in  pension  assets  (i.e.,  -0.55 
+ 1.14 = $0.59 of market value per dollar of pension assets). This coeffi- 
cient of pension assets has a larger standard error (0.91), implying that 
when  pension  assets  and pension  liabilities are included  as separate 
variables neither can be estimated with any precision.2h 
Using the liability variables adjusted to a common average interest rate 
(eq. [5.3] and [5.4]) permits much more precise parameter estimates. The 
implied coefficient of vested pension liabilities is -  0.91 with a standard 
error of 0.32, while the implied coefficient of pension assets is 0.29 with a 
standard error of  0.42. This implies that liabilities have  a substantial 
negative effect on the market value of the firm that is not significantly Table 7.5  Adjusted Pension Liabilities and Assets on the Market Value of the Firm 
Total Market Value of  Debt and Equity  Market Value of  Corporate Equity 
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Note:  See text for definitions.  Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  All amounts are inflation adjusted. 
"Actual  interest rate. 
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different from minus one, while assets have a much smaller effect that 
may not differ from zero. One possible reason for this asymmetry is that 
the financial market may regard large pension assets as an indication that 
the firm projects large pension liabilities that will have to be paid on the 
basis of  future employment service.*’ 
The estimates  based on the market value of corporate equity imply that 
pension assets have a greater effect that is not significantly different from 
the effect  of  pension  liabilities.  In equation (53,  for  example,  the 
implied effect of pension assets is $0.94 of market value per dollar of 
pension  assets. With the more precisely  estimated  coefficients  corre- 
sponding to a common average discount rate, the implied coefficient of 
pension liabilities is  -0.91  (with a standard error of  0.29), while the 
implied coefficient of pension assets is 0.55 with a standard error of 0.36. 
The difference between those two coefficients is marginally significant; 
the corresponding t-statistic is 1.8 and therefore significant at the 7% 
level. 
Taken at face value, the coefficients in table 7.5 generally imply that 
each  dollar  increase  in  a  firm’s pension  liabilities reduces the firm’s 
market value by about one dollar while each dollar increase in pension 
assets increases in value by  less than one dollar.  If  this is correct, it 
provides at least a short-run reason for firms not to fully fund or overfund 
their pensions. It also implies that, to the extent that firms make pension 
promises that reduce the savings of employees, the market perceives the 
extra liability and therefore has the information to adjust other personal 
saving. At the same time, the lower coefficient  of  the pension  assets 
variable implies that the market does not accurately reflect the extent of 
asset accumulation in the pension fund. The net effect of  this is that an 
increase in a funded vested liability reduces the market value of the firm 
and induces additional saving. 
7.4.2  Positive and Negative Net Liabilities 
A different but related issue is raised by the fact that pension assets 
exceed liabilities for the majority of the firms in our sample. Does the 
market respond  differently  to “unfunded” pension  liabilities  that are 
positive and to the unfunded liabilities that are negative and therefore 
represent an additional net asset of the firm? To answer this question, we 
have  divided  each  unfunded  pension  liability  variable  into two vari- 
ables-for  example, PUVPLIA is  UVPLIA if this is a positive amount 
(implying that liabilities exceed assets) and NUVPLiA if  UVPLIA is a 
negative amount (implying that assets exceed liabilities.) 
Table 7.6 presents the estimated coefficients of the positive and nega- 
tive pension liability variables. These coefficients are based on the same 
basic specification used in tables 7.1 and 7.4. The pension liabilities are Table 7.6  Effects of Positive and Negative Net Pension Liabilities on the Market Value of the Firm 
Coefficient of 
Liability Variables  t-Statistics 
If  Net Liability Is:  for Equality  Sum of 
of  Coefficients  Squared 
Positive  Negative  (Probability)  Residuals 
Total market value of 
debt and equity 
Net vested liability 
Net accrued liability 
Market value of 
corporate equity 
Net vested liability 




-  1.87 
-  2.54 
(0.88) 
(0.63) 









1.55  12.64 
1.59  12.48 
(0.12) 
(0.11) 
1.96  21.60 
1.77  21.47 
(0.05) 
(0.08) 
Note:  Coefficients are from specifications like eq. (1) and (2) in the text but with unfunded pension liability split into positive and negative variable firms; 
see text for full description. All equations are based on inflation adjusted data and on pension liabilities adjusted to a common average discount rate. 200  Martin Feldstein/Randall M~rck 
adjusted to a common  average discount  rate and  all of  the data are 
adjusted for inflation. 
All four parameter estimates show a much larger negative coefficient 
for  the firms with  actual unfunded  liabilities (the “positive”  liability 
coefficients) than for the firms in which assets exceed liabilities. In each 
case, the pension coefficient for the firms in which assets exceed liabilities 
is approximately  -0.5  with a standard error of  about 0.4. These coef- 
ficients are therefore not significantly different from either zero or minus 
one. In contrast, the pension coefficient for the firms in which liabilities 
exceed assets is approximately minus two with a standard error of about 
0.8. These coefficients are all significantly different from zero and again 
not significantly different from minus one. 
An explicit test of the equality of the two pension coefficients in each 
equation indicates that equality cannot be rejected at the 10% probability 
level in the equations relating to the total market value of the firm but can 
be rejected at the 5% and 8% probability levels in the equation for the 
market value of  corporate equity. 
How should these estimates be interpreted? One possible interpreta- 
tion is that, because  of  the large standard errors, there is no need to 
distinguish between the two types of firms or to revise the conclusion that 
an extra dollar of unfunded vested pension liability reduces the market 
value of the firm by approximately one dollar. An alternative “statistical” 
explanation  is  that the equation is  misspecified  and omits  additional 
variables that are observed by participants in the financial markets and 
are correlated with  the size of  pension  liabilities. Thus, although the 
financial market may correctly reduce or increase a company’s market 
value  by  one dollar for each dollar of  positive or negative  unfunded 
vested  pension  liability,  our estimated  coefficient  instead  reflects  the 
impact of the additional omitted variables. 
It is, however, also possible that the observed difference between the 
“positive” and “negative” coefficients are more than statistical artifact 
and do reflect the way that the financial market responds differently to 
these two types of firms. Since a firm that fails to fund fully its vested or 
past service liability incurs a higher corporate tax than would otherwise 
be necessary, a firm’s failure to fund these liabilities may be an indication 
to the financial market that the firm is in a financially weak position or is 
not well managed. This could account for coefficients of the unfunded 
liability variables that are absolutely greater than one. This argument 
would, however,  suggest a symmetrically favorable effect on a firm’s 
market value if  its pension liabilities are substantially overfunded and 
therefore an equally  large negative coefficient  for firms with  negative 
unfunded liabilities. One reason why this is not observed is that, as we 
noted earlier in this section, the financial market may regard large pen- 
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pension benefits that are not yet vested or based on past service but that 
can be reasonably anticipated for the future. We can think of  no way to 
test this two-part explanation. 
7.5  Why Firms Choose Different Interest Assumptions 
As we noted in section 7.3, the choice of the discount rate has a very 
powerful effect on the value of vested and other accrued pension liabili- 
ties. Because these benefits are based only on employees’ past service, 
future wage rates and turnover rates are irrelevant. As a rough approx- 
imation, the value of  unfunded pension liabilities varies in inverse pro- 
portion to the assumed interest rate. 
The tax law provides a strong reason for companies to assume a low 
interest rate. By increasing the value of  its pension liability, the firm can 
justify accumulating more pension assets. For any given stream of antici- 
pated benefits, the accumulation of more pension assets is equivalent to 
reducing the real cost of those pensions. The reduced cost reflects the fact 
that the earnings in the pension fund are untaxed while earnings on assets 
held by the corporation are taxed and the interest rate that the corpora- 
tion pays on its own debt is deductible from taxable income. 
If the tax benefits of early funding were the only influence on the choice 
of  an interest rate assumption, firms would choose the lowest permissible 
interest rate. But a low interest rate assumption also has its disadvan- 
tages. Firms may wish to avoid making the large annual funding pay- 
ments that would result from a low interest assumption and may not wish 
to report that they have large unfunded pension liabilities. To the extent 
that this is true, they will prefer a higher interest assumption. 
A large unfunded liability requires a firm to increase the annual con- 
tribution to its pension fund. This directly reduces the firm’s reported 
earnings. A firm may fear that this in turn will have an adverse effect on 
the market price of  the firm’s stock because portfolio investors do not 
correctly perceive the reason for the lower reported earnings. Moreover, 
a firm that has limited access to credit or that faces a rising marginal cost 
of  funds may prefer to postpone funding. To the extent that a firm can 
fund as much as it wants at a moderate or high interest rate, it will have no 
incentive to use a lower interest rate. 
A large unfunded liability may also be regarded by corporate manage- 
ment as undesirable in itself. It would not be unreasonable for them to 
fear that such a liability would depress the equity value of the firm and 
increase its cost of debt. If financial investors are unable to take the firm’s 
choice of interest rate into account in interpreting its reputed liability, the 
firm may be able to raise its value by selecting a high interest rate that 
causes pension liabilities to be understated. 
Firms that have large vested pension liabilities when calculated at some 202  Martin FeldsteidRandall M~rck 
standard rate will have more incentive to reduce their apparent liability 
by selecting a high interest rate. Even more likely, firms that have large 
unfunded liabilities (when valued at a standard interest rate) will have an 
incentive to choose a high interest rate and virtually nothing to gain by 
choosing a low rate. Conversely, firms in which pension assets exceed 
liability (when valued at a standard rate) will have no reason to disguise 
the size of their promised liability and every reason to increase the size of 
that liability in order to increase the rate of  tax-deductible funding. 
The evidence that we have examined indicates that firms do systemati- 
cally choose their interest rate assumption in the way that this analysis 
suggests. Table 7.7 presents estimates of  the way in which the choice of 
interest rate is influenced by the firm’s pension liability (adjusted to the 
common average discount rate to permit comparability) and by  other 
variables that measure the firm’s financial condition. 
Equation (7.1) shows that firms with large vested pension  liabilities 
tend to choose high interest rate assumptions. The assumed interest rate 
is  related  even  more strongly to the firm’s unfunded  vested  pension 
liability, a fact shown in equation (7.2). Firms with higher ratios of net 
debt to assets may be more reluctant to increase the size of their pension 
fund and therefore may  prefer  a  higher  assumed interest  rate. The 
coefficient of  DEBTIA in equation (3) is positive but just barely larger 
than its standard error. 
Equations (7.4) and (7.5) indicate that the choice of  the interest rate 
assumption  can  also  be explained  by  reference  to the total  accrued 
pension liabilities, although that variable has somewhat weaker explana- 
tory power than the vested liability. Equations (7.6) and (7.7) indicate 
that firms with better bond ratings choose higher interest rates.” Again 
the coefficient of this variable is only slightly larger than its standard error 
and may be due to chance. If it is not due to chance, the positive relation 
between bond rating and the choice of interest assumptions suggests that 
the causation is actually from the interest rate assumption to the bond 
rating. Thus, a firm with a given “true” value of UVPLiA that chooses a 
high  interest rate assumption will  appear to have  a  smaller  pension 
liability. This in turn makes the firm appear financially sound if the rating 
agency does not take its interest rate assumption into account. 
The  last three equations are based on data that have not been adjusted 
for inflation. Those results are quite similar to the corresponding equa- 
tions with inflation-adjusted data. 
It is clear from the estimates presented in table 7.7 that firms do  engage 
in strategic attempts to reduce their reported unfunded vested pension 
liabilities when the benefits from doing so may outweigh the tax advan- 
tages of  early funding. Table 7.7  Factors Affecting the Interest Rate Assumed in Calculating Reported Pension Liabilities 
Inflation  Bond 
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Note:  The dependent variable in all equations in the interest rate chosen by the firm for calculating the pension liability that it reports. The  pension liability 
variables are all based on the common average rate. 204  Martin FeldsteidRandall  M~ck 
7.6  Conclusion 
The purpose of the current study has been to assess the extent to which 
the market  value  of  firms reflects  accurately  their unfunded  pension 
obligations. Although there are substantial problems in measuring pen- 
sion liabilities and in specifying an appropriate framework for estimating 
their effect on market values, the results presented in this chapter can be 
said to be generally consistent with theview that the market value of firms 
reflects a conventional measure of  unfunded pension obligations or net 
pension assets. 
The value of vested pension liabilities depcnds critically on the interest 
rate that firms use to discount future benefit obligations. The 132 large 
manufacturing firms in the sample used  a wide range of  interest rates 
from 5.0% to 10.5% in  evaluating their  1979 pension liabilities. The 
choice of  interest rate appears to reflect the deliberate policy by which 
firms with  substantial  benefit  obligations  relative  to existing  pension 
assets try to reduce the reputed present value of their obligation. Simi- 
larly, firms in which pension assets are large relative to benefit obligations 
tend to choose low interest rate assumptions in order to increase the tax 
advantages of early funding. 
The financial market appears to “see through” this manipulation of 
pension liabilities and sets market values that are related more closely to 
a pension obligation evaluated at a common standard interest rate than to 
the pension obligations as reported by the firms. Although an appropriate 
interest rate for evaluating pension obligations would be the long-term 
interest rate prevailing in 1979, our evidence indicates that market values 
of  firms are related much more closely to pension liabilities evaluated at 
the average rate used by all of the firms in our sample (7.2%) than to the 
pension liabilities implied by the Baa rate (12.1%). 
The majority of firms in the sample have pension assets that exceed the 
value of  pension liabilities. There is some evidence in our estimates that 
the market gives more weight to pension liabilities than to pension assets 
and responds more to variations in the excess of liabilities over assets than 
to the excess of assets over liabilities. Although we offer some tentative 
explanations of these asymmetries, we are aware that they might also be 
an indication of a misspecification of  the basic equations. 
More research with additional data could help to resolve some of  the 
remaining problems.  Using cross-section data on a panel of  firms for 
several years would permit eliminating firm-specific effects that may bias 
the estimated effect of the pension liabilitics. With data for several years, 
it  might  also be  possible  to modify  the measurement  of  earnings to 
include information on pension contributions and the changes in vested 
pension liabilities. It would certainly be very useful to obtain data on the 
age distribution of  vested  benefit  obligations in order to improve the 
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If  the two basic findings of this study-that  the market appears to see 
through the “pension veil” and that the market value of the firm reflects 
pension obligations evaluated  at an interest rate that is far below the 
market rate-are  correct, they have important implications for the rela- 
tion of pensions to national saving. First, pension liabilities are evaluated 
at an interest rate that is too low; the present value of  those liabilities is 
overstated. Thus, share prices are depressed by larger pension obliga- 
tions and shareholders have an increased incentive to save. Second, if 
pension assets are correctly perceived by the financial market, the extent 
of pension funding will not influence aggregate private saving. Moreover, 
to the extent that the evidence of Section 7.4  implies that the market gives 
too little value to pension assets, an increase in pension assets will not 
reduce other private saving by an offsetting amount. The overstatement 
of  pension liabilities and the possible understatement  of  pension assets 
thus suggests that the expanding size of  the private pension system may 
increase total saving by companies and their shareholders.’Y 
Notes 
1.  These interest rates are  reported by firms in their annual reports and were tabulated in 
Kotlikoff and Smith (1983). 
2.  The  same problem also affects the share prices studies of  Oldfield (1977) and Gerso- 
vitz (1980),  as well as any other study that uses the reported values of  pension liabilities. 
3.  In the extreme case in which employees reduce direct personal saving by one dollar 
for every dollar of  present value of promised pension  benefits, the introduction of  the 
pension would have no effect on total saving. 
4. In the special case referred to in note 3,  the provision of  a private pension could 
actually reduce national saving. 
5. When the pension liabilities are reevaluated using the market interest rate instead of 
the lower  values  assumed by  the companies in  their calculations,  significantly higher 
fractions of the companies have assets that exceed their liabilities. Using the Baa bond rate 
prevailing at the end of  the sample year suggests that virtually all firms in the sample had 
pension assets in excess of  both vested and past service liabilities. 
6. This need not be true if employees reduce their own saving to offset the benefits that 
they anticipate on the basis of  their expected future employment experience and not just the 
benefit rights that they have already accumulated. 
7.  Hayashi (1982) shows the conditions under which the marginal and average value of 
capital are equal. 
8.  King (1977),  Auerbach (197Y), and Feldstein and Green (1979) discuss the effect of 
taxes on the markct valuc of  marginal additions to the capital stock. 
9. It would in principle be desirable to adjust E by adding to  it the difference between the 
firm’s pension contribution and the increase in vested benefits during the year. Such an 
adjustment would be unlikely to have a substantial effect since completely omitting E or 
GROW or both does not change the implied effect of  WPLIA. 
10. This variable is defined in the same way as it was in Feldstein and Seligman (1981): 
the difference between average earnings in the most recent 5 years and average earnings in 
the previous 5 years divided by the 1979 value of  physical assets in the final years of  this 
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11. Net debt is defined as total financial liabilities minus financial assets. Short-term 
assets and liabilities are included at book value, but long-term liabilities are revalued by 
assuming that they have a remaining maturity of 10 years and pay a 9% coupon rate but are 
valued to have the 1979 year-end yield to maturity of  about 12%. For many firms in our 
sample net debt is actually negative; financial assets including cash and accounts receivable 
exceed financial liabilities. 
12. See Myers (1977) and Gordon and Malkiel (1981). 
13.  If  the  unfunded  liability  is  negative,  it  actually  represents  a  financial asset  or 
“negative debt.” 
14. See section 1  of  Feldstein and Seligman (1981) for a discussion of the problems of 
pension liability measurement  and the inadequacies of  the reported  estimates. Note in 
particular that unfunded liabilities are tax deductible when funded or paid. Similarly, until 
liabilities are paid, the relevant interest rate is a net of  tax rate. 
15.  The measures of  earnings and earnings growth should be adjusted by adding the 
pension expenses and subtracting the increase in accrued pension liability. This correction is 
not possible with the data available for a single year. It is reassuring therefore  that the 
estimated effect of unfunded vested pension liabilities is not affected by completely omitting 
both E and GROW from the equation. 
16. There are so many problems of measurement that we are reluctant to give a stronger 
interpretation. Nevertheless, while coefficients not significantly different from minus one 
could occur by chance in the current and previous study, we  regard that as unlikely 
17. The mean of the dependent variable is 1.30, substantially higher than the inflation- 
adjusted value. 
18. The dependent variable is VEiAE  where VE  is the market value of the firm’s stock 
and AE is the difference between the value of property, plant, equipment, and inventories 
and the firm’s net debt. The mean of  this variable is 0.82 when the data are adjusted for 
inflation and 1.54 when they are not. 
19. Despite the tax advantage of investing pension funds exclusively in debt instruments 
(Black 1980~;  Tepper 1981), most pensions invest in both debt and equity and, considering 
the greater risk of  equity as a method of funding nominal liabilities, expect to earn an even 
higher nominal return on equity. It might, however, be argued that the appropriate rate for 
discounting future liabilities is a risk-free rate, with any extra return going to shareholders as 
compensation for assuming the portfolio risk while guaranteeing the benefits. But even a 
10-year United States Treasury bond had a 1979 year-end yield of  10.4%. 
20.  A typical defined-benefit pension plan makes retirement benefits proportional to the 
product of the final year’s (or years’) earnings and the number of years of employment with 
the firm. 
21.  The low interest rate assumption is advantageous to the firm because it permits the 
firm to make greater tax-deductible pension contributions. We return to this in section 7.5. 
22.  The mean absolute value of  unfunded vested pension liabilities as a percentage of 
pension assets was only 6.56%; for total accrued pension liabilities, the corresponding figure 
was 7.02%. 
23.  The actuarial present value was calculated using the 1978  age-specific death rates for 
white males that are presented in the 1980 Statistical Abstract of  the  United States. 
24.  This may be offset to the extent that retirees had lower nominal earnings before 
retirement  than employees currently have. 
25.  Jeremy  Bulow  has  told  us  that  he  has  sought  to  establish  a  relation  between 
unfunded pension liabilities and the rate of return on equity over the previous decade (as a 
measure of  the “quality” of  the firm) but found none. 
26. It is, however, possible to say that the difference between  the coefficients of  the 
liability and asset variables is statistically significant. 
27.  Recall that a firm can accumulate pension assets only to the extent that it can satisfy 
the Internal  Revenue Service that these assets are a reasonable provision against future 207  Pension Funding Interest Rate Assumptions, and Share Prices 
pension liabilities. Note also that this explanation assumes that the value of  such liabilities 
will not be offset by lower wages in the future. Stewart Myers has pointed out to us that, 
when separate coefficients are estimated for pension assets and liabilities, it is not possible to 
distinguish among different assumed constant discount rates. The superiority of a common 
rate over varying individual assumptions remains. 
28.  Recall that the bond rating variable scores Moody’s Aaa bonds as 9 and decreases 
the score linearly with lower bond ratings. 
29.  Any conclusion about the overall effect of  pensions on saving depends also on the 
response of  employees to promised pension benefits. It is of course possible that employees 
may substitute promised pension  benefits for direct saving. If  the interest rate that they 
would anticipate on their own direct saving is less than  the interest  rate  earned by  the 
pension  fund, total  saving  could  decline.  Alternatively,  the  higher  potential  yield  on 
pension  saving might induce employees to increase planned retirement  consumption by 
enough to raise the level of current saving despite the higher interest rate. The problem is 
closely related to the discussion in Feldstein (197%). 
Comment  Stewart C. Myers 
Professors Feldstein and Morck have written a worthwhile extension of 
the previous Feldstein-Seligman  paper (1981) on pension funding and 
share prices. The previous paper’s chief result stands: that investors see 
through over- or underfunding of firms’ pension liabilities. I am comfort- 
able with this result because it is consistent with the widely held view that 
capital markets are information efficient. However, as one  person’s truth 
is another’s econometric difficulty, I have tried to cast a critical eye on the 
paper. 
Feldstein and Mmck’s tests require a valuation model fitted to a cross 
section of firms. Cross-sectional tests have fallen out of favor in financial 
research. However, in this case the alternative time-series  test would 
require observing the stock market’s reaction  to changes  in  a firm’s 
pension funding policy. Because these changes are usually not discrete, 
easily identified events, like a merger or earnings announcement, time- 
series tests seem impractical. 
Of course, Feldstein and Mmck do not need a completely satisfactory 
valuation model. They just need to control for profitability, risk, growth, 
and other factors that affect value, especially variables that might be 
correlated with pension funding policy. Here the refinements and elab- 
orations could go on forever.’ However, they have tested enough com- 
binations and definitions of control variables to quiet all but one of my 
doubts. 
I still worry about a  “weak  firm effect.” If  highly profitable firms 
overfund, or poor performers underfund, the causality of Feldstein and 
Stewart C. Myers is professor of  finance at the Sloan School of  Management,  Mas- 
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M~rck’s  equations is reversed.  For example, poor performance would 
cause low stock prices and underfunded pensions. 
Casual observation  suggests that weak  firms underfund.  Moreover, 
there are at least three a priori reasons to expect them to do so: (1) The 
tax advantages of funding are typically less for poorly performing firms, 
which are more likely to have tax loss carryforwards or to face a low 
marginal tax rate. (2) Debt covenants are typically written in terms of 
accounting earnings. A firm under financial pressure may try to loosen 
the covenants by cutting back pension funding. (3) Managers manage 
earnings by choice of accounting technique. They can smooth earnings 
through pension funding decisions. (Feldstein and Morck find that firms 
also manage their reported pension liabilities by choice of the rate used to 
discount vested future benefits.) 
Feldstein and Morck of  course recognize  the weak  firm effect and 
introduce the firm’s bond rating as proxy for it. The book earnings, risk, 
and growth variables should also help. However, if the weak firm effect is 
important, it will be difficult to find any manageable set of variables that 
will control for it in a single-equation, cross-sectional model. Thus, a still 
more elaborate version of  the Feldstein-Morck chapter would probably 
not settle the issue. We really need a careful study of the pension funding 
decision, as distinct from its effects. 
Section 7.3 of the chapter explores the effects of adjusting for arbitrary 
differences in firms’ actuarial interest rate assumptions. The results seem 
to indicate that investors see through  these differences  and evaluate 
pension liabilities at a common rate. We learn very little about what 
common rate is used, however. 
This point deserves further explanation. The adjustment to a common 
rate affects only  vested  pension  liabilities (VPL). Pension  assets are 
reported at market value. Suppose unfunded vested liabilities (UVPL) 
are calculated at a common Baa rate (12.1%). The calculation is 
actuarial rate  UVPL(Baa) = VPL 
where PA indicates pension assets. 
Using the average actuarial rate (7.2%), 
UVPL(average) = VPL (actuari:  rate 
= vPL(naa)(-)  12.1 -  PA. 
7.2 
PA 
Thus, the only effect of substituting the average for the Baa rate is to 
multiply  VPL(Baa) by  a constant. The better  fit  and  more  sensible 
coefficients obtained using the average rather than the Baa rate must 
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assets. This suggests entering  assets and liabilities as  separate  variables. It 
does not suggest that investors disregard current interest rates in assess- 
ing a firm’s pension liabilities. 
Feldstein and M0rck do examine pension assets and liabilities sepa- 
rately in section 7.4 of their chapter. The results seem to confirm that the 
market deducts more from market value for pension liabilities than it 
adds for assets. If  the difference is real, it poses a puzzle: If  investors 
value pension liabilities correctly, which requires a difficult adjustment 
for differences in actuarial interest rates, why can they not value assets, 
which require no adjustment? 
The work  of  Black  (19806) and Tepper (1981) suggests a possible 
explanation.  They showed that tax-paying, value-maximizing firms ought 
to invest their pension fund in taxable bonds, offset by borrowing on the 
corporate account.  Investing any significant fraction in stocks as most 
firms do, appears suboptimal. Could the low weight given to pension 
assets reflect a penalty for inferior portfolio strategies? 
I would summarize my reactions to Feldstein and Morck’s chapter as 
follows. Like most good research, it settles some questions and opens up 
new ones. It confirms that investors recognize unfunded pension liabili- 
ties. In fact, it is by far the most thorough and intelligent study of this 
issue. The most important open question is not whether investors take 
pension  assets and liabilities into account,  but  how they  do so. The 
different coefficients for pension assets and liabilities suggest the market 
may value them on assumptions different than Feldstein and Mmck’s. 
The only issue  that might  undercut  the chapter’s main  qualitative 
conclusions is the “weak firm effect”-the  possibility  that low market 
value leads to pension underfunding, not vice versa. This possibility will 
be hard to address without a better understanding of the pension funding 
decision, not just the capital markets’ reaction to it. 
Note 
1. For example, cornmon-stock betas should not be used to explain the valuation of the 
firm as a whole. We know that financial leverage affects stock betas. 
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